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I. INTRODUCTION
Most countries require banks to hold extra capital to protect against
unforeseen financial calamities; banks with riskier loans must hold more
capital than those with safer loans. Basel II, a set of international banking
standards, allows banks to measure a loan’s risk in different ways: some
banks make their own judgments; others use outside agencies. The recent
mortgage crisis prompted banks to reevaluate these methods, in part due
to banks having failed to perceive the high level of risk inherent in
securitized mortgages. The international community’s response was Basel
III, an updated version of its previous standards. This Comment will look
at how Basel III’s implementation will change the way banks measure
the credit risk of their loans.
Part I of this comment will examine how credit risk measurement fits
into the overall Basel scheme; Part II will analyze Basel II’s options for
estimating credit risk; Part III will illustrate how inaccurate credit risk
estimations contributed to the mortgage crisis; Part IV will explain the
new Basel III rules; and Parts IV and V will examine problems with the
Basel III rules and propose some solutions.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENTS
One important component of the financial crisis of 2008 was poor
information.1 Banks and investors falsely believed that they held low-risk
assets;2 regulators incorrectly believed that banks had enough capital to
weather tough times;3 and both banks and regulators mistakenly believed
that they had fully accounted for all possible risks.4 Although no single

* J.D. May 2012, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to thank
my faculty advisor Professor Frank Partnoy for his invaluable insight and feedback, and
the entire San Diego International Law Journal editorial board for their suggestions and
guidance in editing this comment. I would also like to express my gratitude to my
family–Dad, Mom and Sarah–for their continuous encouragement and support, and to
Jane, for her patience and understanding.
1. Generalizing about the financial crisis of 2008 is for all practicable purposes
nearly impossible. For an account that focuses on some of the individuals who played
influential roles leading up to the crisis, see generally BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA,
ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, (Penguin
Books 2010) (2010). Alternatively, for an account of a few individuals who anticipated
the crash and made a fortune betting that it would happen, see generally MICHAEL LEWIS,
THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE, (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
2011) (2011).
2. See Peter King & Heath Tarbert, Basel III: An Overview, 30 BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL’Y REP., May 2011, at 3.
3. Id. at 2–3.
4. Id. at 3.
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factor caused the financial crisis, reliance on bad information played a
significant role.
Prior to the financial crises, specific rules designed to prevent banks
from failing had been in place.5 Regulations derived from the Basel II
accord, an international agreement that set baseline capital requirements
for banks, were in force in many countries.6 The basic idea behind the
original Basel rules, Basel I, was that banks were required to counterbalance
risky investments with a sufficient cushion of backup capital.7 Because
some loans are riskier than others, Basel I “weighed” each one. Depending
upon the kinds of loans the bank made, the bank would have to hold
more, or less, extra capital.8 Essentially, the Basel rules classified each
loan under a different category of riskiness.9 Under Basel I, generally
only one method of categorizing an asset’s level of risk existed.10 Later,
Basel II attempted to give banks more flexibility by offering the banks
more choices: banks could use credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) or their
own risk models.11
The Basel II rules presumed that both the CRAs and the bank’s
internal models were accurate.12 If either model misjudged the riskiness
of particular assets, the rules would require the bank to hold too much,
or too little, capital.13 Unfortunately, neither the internal models nor the

5. One Basel Leads to Another, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2006, at 10, 12.
6. The origin of the Basel rules was a response to the failure of an internationally
connected German bank in 1974. The event prompted the Basel Committee to publish
the first Basel accord in 1988. Id. at 10.
7. King & Tarbert, supra note 2, at 1.
8. One Basel Leads to Another, supra note 5, at 10. For example, a loan to a rich
Western country would have a risk weight of 20%, but a loan to a company would have a
risk weight of 100%. Id. Thus, the borrowing party determined how risky the loan was
and therefore the amount of capital the bank had to hold. King & Tarbert, supra note 2,
at 2.
9. Id.
10. See id.; Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements
[BIS], International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 14,
17, 18 (July 1988 updated to Apr. 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf.
11. King & Tarbert, supra note 2, at 2.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part III.C. By analogy, if your nutritionist has rules about how much
fat or calories you should eat per day, depending upon your weight, that is fine as long as
your scale is accurate. But if you use a faulty scale, the nutritionist’s rules will cause
you to either eat too much or too little fat, depending upon whether the scale under- or
overestimates your weight.
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CRAs were entirely accurate.14 Neither option was ideal at objectively
measuring risk; each one contained its own unique set of problems.15
III. MEASURING RISK UNDER BASEL II
A. Standardized and Internal Risk-Based Approaches
In an attempt to make its application more flexible, the Basel Committee
broadened Basel I’s “one size fits all” approach into roughly two
categories.16 Basel II therefore provided banks with a choice: use risk
categories based on CRAs or use the bank’s own credit risk models.17
The first approach, known as the “standardized approach,” relies on
CRAs.18 This method is the simpler of the two and “is designed for smaller
banks with less sophisticated risk-modeling and risk-management
systems.” 19
The second, more complicated option is the “internal risk-based
approach” (“IRB”). 20 This approach allows a bank to make its own
assessment of risk, rather than rely on CRAs.21 The IRB option applies
to banks that already have sophisticated risk modeling and risk
management systems in place.22 A bank can use its own data to determine
the risk level of its loans by analyzing 1) the probability of default in one
year, 2) the bank’s exposure and losses if there is a default, and 3) when
the borrower will likely repay if it does not default.23 Within IRB, there
are two further options: advanced IRB and foundation IRB.24 Foundation
IRB entails more oversight than advanced IRB. The foundation approach
allows banks to estimate the probability of default for each asset but
requires the bank supervisors to estimate the three other factors.25 The
advanced approach (which is only available for the most sophisticated

14. King & Tarbert, supra note 2, at 2–3.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. King & Tarbert, supra note 2, at 2.
17. Id.; see Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, BIS, International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, ¶¶ 50-51 (June 2004),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [hereinafter Revised Framework].
18. See id. at ¶ 50.
19. One Basel Leads to Another, supra note 5, at 10.
20. Revised Framework, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 50-51, 211.
21. Id. at 48.
22. One Basel Leads to Another, supra note 5, at 10.
23. Id. The IRB approach also factors in credit risk mitigants, such as insurance
and collateral. Sandra Rutova & Tim Volkheimer, Revisiting the Basel Accords: Lessons
Learned From the Credit Crisis, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 83, 90 (2011).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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banks) permits a bank to make most of the estimates, provided the bank
supervisors approve them.26
B. Assumptions of Basel II
Basel II based its increased flexibility on two assumptions: 1) that
regulators can adequately supervise a bank’s IRB decisions, and 2) that
market discipline will incentivize banks to make prudent decisions.27
Overall, the Basel Committee believed “that the cumulative effect of
implementing strict supervisory review and market discipline, used in
conjunction with risk assessment analysis, [would] create a far more
stable international banking environment.”28 Both assumptions, however,
have been subject to criticism.29
First, the idea that regulators can adequately police large banks may
have been too optimistic. One problem with relying on national regulators
is that they tend to focus on default risk alone. If, for example, a large
bank’s portfolio leaves it exposed to other risks such as changing interest
rates, regulators may miss these potential risks.30
Second, the idea that market discipline will ensure that banks act
prudently may be incorrect.31 Basel II requires banks to make public
information about their assets and liabilities and explain how they measure
credit risk. Some have argued that this requirement does not really
depend upon market discipline but “transparency and disclosure.”32 If
regulators wanted to rely more heavily on market discipline, they could
require banks to issue publicly-traded, subordinated debt, or abolish deposit
insurance.33 Such transparency and disclosure may not be as motivating
as the threat of possible bank failure.

26. Id.
27. Eric Y. Wu, Basel II: A Revised Framework, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
150, 154–55 (2005).
28. Id.
29. See generally One Basel Leads to Another, supra note 5.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Professor George Kaufman of Loyola University in Chicago makes this criticism.
Id.
33. Id.
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C. Problems with Basel II’s Standardized and IRB Approaches
1. Standardized Approach
Basel II’s standardized approach ultimately relies on the judgment of
CRAs,34 whose responsibility is to make it easier for investors to make
informed decisions.35 The two principal purposes of CRAs are to promote
capital market efficiency and to manage risk.36 In theory, CRAs provide
an important function by helping investors mitigate risk, avoid bad
investments, and make more efficient use of their resources.37 In practice,
however, this has not always been the case.38 The relationships between
CRAs, investors, issuers of securities, and regulators create a number of
problems.39
Criticisms of CRAs center around a few basic issues: a conflict of
interest incentivizing CRAs to give inflated ratings;40 so-called “rating
shopping” among issuers of securities;41 CRAs that advise issuers on
how to obtain a certain rating; 42 and the dependence of government
regulations on credit ratings.43

34. See supra Part III.A.
35. See John Crawford, CDO Ratings and Systemic Instability: Causes and Cure,
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 17–21 (2010).
36. Id. at 18. “Ratings are used by regulators and private actors to two principal
ends: risk management and promoting capital market efficiency.” Id. CRAs help
investors manage risk by providing independent analysis of securities. Institutional
investors, for example, can commit to holding certain securities as long as they maintain
a given rating. If a security falls below a specified rating, the fund can automatically
trade the security for something less risky. See id. at 17, 20. In fact, the government
requires that institutional investors like pension funds, insurance companies, and banks
only hold securities that are highly rated. F. Phillip Hosp, Problems and Reforms in
Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handicapping the Credit Rating Agencies, 79 MISS. L.J.
531, 541 (2010). CRAs can also help private parties to manage risk in financial contracts.
By including terms in a contract that are triggered when a CRA downgrades a security,
the party can help avoid potentially larger losses. Crawford, supra note 35, at 20.
CRAs also contribute to market efficiency. Id. By preventing multiple investors from
having to expend time researching securities, CRAs avoid “duplication of effort among
investors. They may also open the market to investors for whom the cost of investigation
would otherwise outweigh a bond’s attractiveness relative to other investments.” Id.
CRAs can also help investors avoid poorly performing investments, especially in cases
where investors cannot access credit quality because the securities are complex, such as
CDOs and MBSs. Id. at 21.
37. See supra Part III.C.
38. See infra Part III.C.1.a.
39. See infra Part III.C.1.
40. See infra Part III.C.1.a.
41. See infra Part III.C.1.a.
42. See infra Part III.C.1.b.
43. See infra Part III.C.1.c.
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a. Conflicts of Interest and Rating Shopping
CRAs are profit-driven companies that must provide objective ratings.44
Furthermore, CRAs are paid by the same people whose securities they
rate.45 The higher the rating a CRA can provide, the more securities an
issuer can sell, and the more likely it is that the issuer will hire that CRA
again.46 CRAs thus have an incentive to inflate their ratings.47 These
conflicts can lead to “rating shopping.”48 Rating shopping occurs when
an issuer discovers beforehand the rating that a CRA will give a particular
issuance. An issuer can obtain this information either by running a
publicly-available rating model or paying a CRA for a preliminary
opinion. The issuer then “shops around” and employs the CRA that will
provide the most favorable rating.49 This race-to-the-bottom scenario is
one principal argument against the issuer-pays model.50

44. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 630 (1999).
45. Id. at 652–53.
46. See id. One counterargument, however, theorizes that reputational concerns
mitigate perverse incentives. Id. at 629–30. A CRA that inflates its ratings, the
argument goes, would quickly lose its reputation for objectivity, which would lead to a
loss of business. Id. at 631, 633. Others have dismissed this line of thought, countering
that reputational integrity does little to balance the fact that CRAs are “captured” by the
firms they rate. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, SarbanesOxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 342 (2003).
47. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 250–51 (2003). Such a conflict can lead to reluctance to
downgrade a security that is clearly poorly performing. Id. One prominent critic of
CRAs, Professor Frank Partnoy, professor of law and finance at the University of San
Diego, notes that in the 1990s, for example, CRAs “downgraded companies only after all
the bad news was in, frequently just days before a bankruptcy filing. Nevertheless,
investors continued to trust the credit-rating agencies, and regulators continued to rely on
them.” Id. Moreover, after the recent mortgage crisis, the SEC found that the “conflicts
created from the ‘issuer pays’ model in rating structured finance products; particularly
RMBS [residential mortgage-backed securities] and related-CDOs, may be exacerbated.”
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1, 31 (2008) [hereinafter RATING
AGENCIES].
48. Crawford, supra note 35, at 44.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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b. CRA Consulting
CRAs often advise issuers on how to organize securities in order to
receive a particular rating. Mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”) and
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), both of which were prevalent
leading up to the financial crisis, are both malleable51 and complex.52
Their complexity, however, makes their risk level difficult to estimate.53
Frequently, CRAs give issuers advice on “credit enhancement”54 (ways
to improve the rating by insuring or collateralizing the security), and on
how to separate the security into different pools of risk. 55 Although the
SEC later issued a rule preventing the same CRA from both advising and
rating the security,56 most CRAs employ similar methodologies, and thus
advice from one CRA often translates to another.57
c. Government Reliance on CRAs
A related problem is the fact that numerous laws and regulations rely
upon CRA ratings.58 In the 1970s, the SEC decided to only recognize
government-approved CRAs (known as Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”)).59 Since then, the number of regulations
relying on these agencies now extends beyond securities to the areas of

51. See infra Part IV.A; RATING AGENCIES, supra note 47. MBSs and CDOs are
malleable in that the issuer has lot of discretion in deciding what to include in the
security. By analogy, in the same way that a cook can vary a dish’s spiciness by altering
the number and variety of hot peppers in it, the issuer can vary a security’s riskiness by
changing the pools of loans that compose it. The designer of a CDO increases its risk
level by choosing to include, for example, risky sub-prime mortgages. See infra Part
IV.A.
52. See infra Part IV.
53. Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International
and Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 615 (2010).
54. Id. at 632.
55. Id.; see generally Csaba Rusznak, Note, The Use of Mortgage-Backed Securities in
International Comparative Perspective: Lessons and Insights, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 823 (2010).
56. Dam, supra note 53, at 632; SEC Issues Rules on Conflicts in Credit Rating,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/business/economy/
04sec.html.
57. Rusznak, supra note 55, at 832–34.
58. Deryn Darcy, Survey, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the
“Issuer Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605, 625–26 (2009).
59. Id. at 624–26. This rule was the “net capital rule” for broker dealers, which the
SEC would only allow NRSROs to rate. Id. The three major CRAs—Moody’s, Fitch,
and Standard & Poor’s—are all NRSROs. There are ten firms registered as NRSROs.
Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
nrsro.htm (last modified May 12, 2011).
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pensions, banking, real estate, and insurance regulation.60 Professor Frank
Partnoy argues that giving the NRSROs such market power permits them to
grant “regulatory licenses.”61 Professor Partnoy suggests that a private
entity, rather than a regulator, can essentially determine the substantive
effect of legal rules.62 Thus, the ratings “are essentially only valuable
because they reduce the issuer’s regulatory costs, not because they are
credible or accurate.” 63 For example, certain federal rules require
institutional investors to buy only investment grade debt or better.64 If
one CRA rates a given security above that level, then that CRA, rather
than a government regulator, has the ability to control whether that
security is “government approved.”65 Basel II’s standardized approach,
which relies on CRAs, is also an example of this.
2. The IRB Approach
Under Basel II’s IRB approach, banks that are more sophisticated can
use their own models to measure credit risk.66 These models are similar
to the models that CRAs use.67 Banks, however, also lack incentives to
be wholly objective in their analysis.68

60. Darcy, supra note 58, at 625–26.
61. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 623.
62. Id.
63. Darcy, supra note 58, at 626.
64. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV.
127, 131 (2009).
65. RATING AGENCIES, supra note 47, at 1–2. Despite years of regulatory reliance
on CRAs, some government agencies have admitted that CRAs have not always
performed well. See generally id. In July 2008, the SEC published a report based on its
investigation of the CRAs’ performance around the mortgage crisis. Id. Among its
conclusions, the SEC found that due to the increased volume and complexity of MBSs
and CDOs, “some of the rating agencies appear to have struggled with the growth [of
MBSs and CDOs];” that the CRAs needed to create better conflict of interest procedures;
and that there needed to be more comprehensive documentation and justification of the
methods that were used to rate the securities. Id. at 1–2. The SEC also found that the
surveillance processes used by the rating agencies (used to monitor a security’s
performance after it has been rated) appear to have been less comprehensive than the
initial ratings. Id. at 21.
66. See supra Part III.A.
67. The use of these models began in the 1980s when Wall Street began employing
mathematicians to help them more effectively manage risk. Erik F. Gerding, The
Dangers of Delegating Financial Regulation to Risk Models, 29 BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL’Y REP., April 2010, at 1. Because these models could quantify risk, they
were also used “to develop and price complex financial products, including novel forms
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First, capital adequacy rules generally require banks to hold more
capital for riskier assets and less for safer ones.69 Banks may then use
unreserved capital elsewhere to make money. All things being equal, banks
would rather hold a small amount of reserve capital than a large amount.
Thus, banks have an incentive to underestimate the risk of their assets.
And if regulators do not closely monitor banks but rather “use their
discretion to shy away from demanding that banks improve their risk
models, these models are more likely to understate the actual risk and allow
banks to arbitrage around the leverage ratio more easily.”70 In short,
banks have some leeway to consider their assets lower risk, which means
they hold less capital.71
Second, bank models are not always precise. CDOs and MBSs in
particular are complex and difficult to measure accurately.72 Additionally,
the models may not account for atypical situations: “[w]hile these models
were quite accurate when used to assess risk under normal market
conditions, the financial crisis proved that these same models drastically
underestimated losses when assessing risk in extreme stress situations.”73
Unfortunately, the financial system moved into abnormal territory.74 As
a result, the computer models “crashed spectacularly in the global financial
crisis. Risk models failed to predict the massive losses that started in
residential mortgages and cascaded in waves throughout the U.S. and
international financial markets.”75 The IRB approach is only as effective
as the model the bank uses and the integrity of the people applying it.

of mortgages and other consumer loan products, asset-backed securities and credit
derivatives.” Id. These models facilitated the explosion of sub-prime lending by helping
create individually-tailored interest rates, securitizing MBSs, and pricing derivatives that
were used to insure against risky MBSs and CDOs. Id. at 1–2.
Thus, financial institutions including CRAs, banks and regulators, came to rely heavily
on computer models to quantify risk. Id. Faith in these computer models “was animated
by a belief that risk models enabled financial institutions to price and manage risk
effectively.” Id. at 1. Regulators expressed this belief in the IRB approach in the Basel
II accord, which “authorize[d] national bank regulators to allow certain large banks to set
their own capital requirements according to the internal risk models of the individual
banks.” Id.
68. Id. at 1, 4.
69. See Revised Framework, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 720–723.
70. John Holman, Note, A Flawed Solution: The Difficulties of Mandating a
Leverage Ratio in the United States, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 713, 746 (2011).
71. Id.
72. See infra Part IV.A; supra Part III.C.1.
73. King & Tarbert, supra note 2, at 16 n.18.
74. See Gerding, supra note 67.
75. Id.
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IV. THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: AN EXAMPLE OF HIDDEN CREDIT RISK
One reason it was difficult to measure credit risk was the increased
popularity of a new kind of asset: the MBS.76 The process of obtaining a
mortgage was changing drastically.77 Historically, the process involved two
parties: the bank and the individual.78 Because a bank would ultimately
suffer for making a bad loan, banks were careful to analyze critically
the borrower’s ability to pay the loan back.79 If the bank believed the
borrower was unable to make the payment, it would not issue the loan.
Securitization, however, transformed the relationship between the
borrower and the creditor.80
A. Securitization
Securitization turned mortgages into commercial investments.81
Instead of banks holding an individual’s debt, an investor would hold
pieces of debt from numerous borrowers.82 The process of turning a
mortgage into a security consisted of numerous stages, each performed
by a different party.83 First, the brokers who made loans to the individuals
sold the mortgages to the bank. The banks could then sell the loans in
bulk to entities that repackaged them into securities. The investment
banks created these entities, called “special purpose vehicles” (“SPVs”),
and traded them as MBSs. 84 Now packaged as securities, they were
available for investors to purchase.85 Just as easily as buying stock in IBM,
an investor could purchase a share of the right to receive a part of a
stream of mortgage payments.86 Thus, instead of borrowers repaying the
bank, they essentially repaid investors.87

76. See Dam, supra note 53, at 617.
77. Id. at 611–13.
78. Id. at 611.
79. Rusznak, supra note 55, at 827–28.
80. See Dam, supra note 53, at 611–19.
81. Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008)
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgage
backed_security.html.
82. See id.
83. Rusznak, supra note 55, at 829.
84. Id. at 830.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 829; see also Wilson, supra note 81.
87. Rusznak, supra note 55, at 30.
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Securitization also created perverse incentives. Before securitization,
a bank had reason to avoid making risky loans because it might lose
money,88 but mortgage brokers did not.89 Mortgage brokers only needed
to pass the loans along, like a hot potato. 90 Since mortgage brokers
would not ultimately hold the debt, they were not concerned with the
borrower’s ability to repay.91 Instead, they earned money by selling the
loans to the bank.92 Banks, which were similarly situated, were primarily
concerned with moving the mortgages along as fast as possible.93 Like
mortgage brokers, banks earned their money from fees, instead of charging
interest and holding the loans.94 Finally, SPVs packaged the loans into
securities and sold them to investors.95
Although the concept of securitizing mortgages was not entirely new,
it was the first time commercial and investment banks employed the idea
so feverishly.96 As a new and competitive market, securitization also
attracted innovation, and banks created novel and complex ways to
repackage securities.97 Two such examples are collateralized mortgage
obligations (“CMOs”) and collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”).98
CMOs are formed when different parts of various MBSs are combined
together into a new security.99 Thus, instead of buying a share of a group of
mortgages, an investor buys a share of several groups of mortgages, and
essentially owns the debt of numerous debtors.100 CDOs are formed by
combining parts of a MBS with different kinds of loans—for example,
auto loans, student loans, credit card receivables, or small business loans.101
The resulting security is a CDO.102 Thus, instead of owning the debt of a
group of mortgages, the investor buys a share of a number of different
groups of loans—some mortgages, some not.103 CDOs can be further

88. Id. at 834.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dam, supra note 53, at 612–13.
93. Id. at 612.
94. Another benefit to the banks was the fact that they did not have to wait for
interest to accrue since they earned the fees up front. Id.
95. Id. at 617.
96. See Rusznak, supra note 55, at 830. Mortgage securitization had been done
since the 1980s by government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Id. at 830–31.
97. Dam, supra note 53.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

204

SCHLICKENMAIER - CHANGES 1112 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 14: 193, 2012]

10/24/2016 5:10 PM

Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

combined with other CDOs to create a CDO squared (“CDO2”).104
CDO2s are similar to CDOs in their variety but include exponentially
more loans than CDOs.105
In the short run, this new way of selling mortgages appeared profitable
for everyone.106 First, it made the American dream of owning a home a
reality for people who otherwise would not be able to do so.107 No longer
concerned with loaning to people with bad credit, banks approved more
people for mortgages.108 Second, mortgage brokers profited from increased
lending,109 as did the SPVs for packaging the loans.110
Finally, banks benefitted in two ways. First, banks, like the mortgage
brokers and SPVs, earned increased revenue from fees.111 Second, banks
were able to maneuver around capital requirements by taking the loans
off the banks’ balance sheets.112 Normally, if a bank held an asset like a
risky loan, it was required to hold more capital.113 Securitization, however,
allowed banks to sell the loans they issued, thus taking the loans off of
the banks’ books. Because the banks did not continue to hold the loans,
capital adequacy rules like Basel II no longer applied to those loans, and
banks still profited from the transaction.114
The popularity of these securities caused them to be sold around the
world.115 In fact, by the summer of 2007, the Bank of China held $9 billion
worth of MBSs.116 But the international diffusion of these securities also
created new risks for the global economy.117 Although very profitable,
securitized mortgage loans were “vulnerable to crisis, especially because
institutional purchasers of the securities borrow[ed] to finance the
purchase.” 118 Also contributing to this global risk was the fact that
regulators were often unaware of the dangers these securities posed.
104. See id.
105. Dam, supra note 53.
106. See Rusznak, supra note 55, at 834; Dam, supra note 53, at 612–13, 616–17.
107. Rusznak, supra note 55, at 848.
108. Id. at 831.
109. See supra Part IV.A.
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. See supra Part IV.A.
112. Dam, supra note 53, at 616.
113. See supra Part I.
114. Dam, supra note 53, at 616.
115. Id. at 615.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Institutional investors also used the increased leverage to increase the yield
from their investment. Id.
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B. Lack of Regulation
In the United States, many aspects of mortgage securities were left
unregulated. First, most of the institutions that originated the mortgage
loans were not technically banks and therefore were not subject to
banking regulations. Many were mortgage brokers who made the initial
loans but did not hold them to maturity.119 Left to their own devices,
these companies focused on selling as many mortgages as possible, often
without regard to the likelihood of repayment.120
Second, the emergence of a financial system that functioned like a
bank but was not subject to banking regulations added to the risk.121 In
the process of mortgage securitization, these entities served as middlemen
between the borrowers and the investors.122 The similarities between this
new system and traditional banking were apparent enough that the new
system became known as the “shadow banking system.” 123 Shadow
banking generally refers to institutions like investment banks, finance
companies, money market funds, hedge funds, SPVs, and other entities
that amass and hold financial assets.124
Despite being comparable in size to the traditional banking system and
functioning like a bank, the shadow banking system was not subject
to banking regulations.125 Because some “shadow banks” were highly
leveraged, others relied heavily on short-term funding markets, and none
had explicit government support prior to the crisis, the shadow banking
system was susceptible to panics similar to the kind banks experienced
before the existence of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.126
Third, regulators failed to adequately police the CRAs.127 Compared
to typical security analysis of a corporation or government’s ability to
pay its debt, analyzing MBSs and CDOs was exceedingly complex.128
In the case of MBSs, there were hundreds or thousands of different
borrowers compiled into a single security.129 CDOs compounded that
difficulty by taking pieces of various MBSs, each made up of hundreds
119. Id.
120. See supra Part IV.A.
121. The Monitor, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Report on Shadow
Banking and the Financial Crisis, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., June 2010,
at 27 [hereinafter Shadow Banking].
122. See supra Part IV.A.
123. Shadow Banking, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra Part III.C.1.
128. Dam, supra note 53.
129. Id. (quoting Kenneth E. Scott and John B. Taylor, Why Toxic Assets Are So
Hard to Clean Up, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009 at A13).
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or thousands of borrowers, and combining them with other MBSs, also
made up of hundreds or thousands of borrowers.130 Thus, instead of making
a judgment about a single borrower, investors had to assess hundreds of
thousands of borrowers. In practice, this was impossible.131 As a result,
investors had to look elsewhere for guidance.132 Because MBSs and CDOs
“were especially hard for purchasers to evaluate, [there was a] tendency
to rely on [CRAs].”133 Thus, in the era of MBSs, CRAs gained substantial
influence.134
Meanwhile, regulators did little to ensure that CRAs were accurate.135
This was in part a result of inadequate oversight in the shadow banking
system; “the lack of transparency in the financial markets for structured
products meant that neither investors nor regulators were aware of who
precisely held the subprime mortgage risk.”136 More importantly, CRAs
were ignoring essential information in their assessments because “[t]he
securities regulators did not consider how the loans underlying the
securities were created and did not appear to grasp that rating agencies
had failed to adequately account for the loosening underwriting standards
when assigning ratings.”137
C. The Financial Crisis
A combination of factors led to the mortgage crisis. First, the new
method of packaging and selling mortgages removed incentives for
mortgage brokers to be cautious about lending money.138 Second, banks
started to depend on the fees they earned from selling bundled mortgages.139
Third, an opaque shadow banking system free from regulation made it
difficult for CRAs to provide accurate ratings.140 Fourth, the inaccurate
130. See supra Part IV.A.
131. See Dam, supra note 53.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. This is not to say that they already did not have substantial influence. Some
have long argued that CRAs have been given too much power, even that they constitute
an oligopoly. See Partnoy, supra note 44, at 682.
135. See generally Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied
Tyranny: Is the United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Financial
Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369 (2008).
136. Id. at 386.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part IV.A–B.
139. See supra Part IV.A–B.
140. See supra Part IV.B.
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ratings caused investors to assume more risk than they had intended.141
Finally, an unstable system crashed.142 Worried about the security of
their investments, panicked investors pulled their money out of various
shadow banking institutions.143
The run on the shadow banking system directly affected the commercial
banking system because agreements between commercial banks and
entities within the shadow banking system often required banks to provide
funds in the event of a market disruption.144 “Thus, the commercial banks
came under funding pressures themselves. Even commercial banks that had
not provided these backstop agreements reduced the amount they were
willing to lend in interbank or other money markets.”145
Ultimately, the government had to intervene.146 The unregulated shadow
banking system was in dire need of funding that only the U.S. government
could provide.147 And the U.S. government provided it.148 “With each of
these extraordinary measures, the Federal Reserve effectively extended to
the shadow banking system its role as the lender of last resort, a role that
the central bank had traditionally reserved for commercial banks and
savings institutions.”149
D. Assigning Blame
In the aftermath of the mortgage crisis, CRAs received much of the
public’s blame.150 The heads of the major CRAs were brought before
Congress and scolded.151 One congressman compared their conflicts of
interest to a sporting event stating, “[W]hen the referee is being paid by
the players, no one should be surprised when the game spins out of
control.”152 An infamous email exchange between two Standard & Poor’s
employees epitomized the CRAs’ lack of due diligence.153 Referring to a
particular MBS, the email exchange admitted “[the] deal [was] ridiculous,”
141. See supra Part IV.B.
142. Shadow Banking, supra note 121.
143. Id. This happened in three separate periods: the liquidity crisis of 2007, the
run on Bears Stearns, and the panic of September 2008. Id.
144. Id. at 27.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 28.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Cyrus Sanati, Rating Agencies Draw Fire on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2008, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/rating-agencies-draw-fire-capitol-hill; see
generally Michael Rowland, Hunt Continues for Financial Crisis Culprits, (ABC television
broadcast Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/s2398826.htm.
151. Sanati, supra note 150.
152. Rowland, supra note 150.
153. Id.
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and that S&P’s analysis “definitely does not capture half the risk.”
Candidly, the email continued to say, “[S&P] should not be rating it,” but
that “[securities] could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”154
Such public shaming prompted governmental action. The attorneys
general of California, New York, and Connecticut began investigations
of the three major agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors
Service, and Fitch Ratings.155 The investigations focused on whether the
agencies had failed to conduct due diligence, whether they had employed
compromised standards and safeguards for profits, and whether they had
conspired with the companies they rated.156
In short, fairly or unfairly, the CRAs became scapegoats for the
mortgage crisis.157 In a 2007 article, The Economist put it succinctly:
“The only truly upbeat firms in America nowadays are the accounting
giants, which for once are not being blamed for a financial disaster (this
time that honour belongs to the rating agencies).”158

154. Id. Another email demonstrated the arbitrary analysis CRAs often used.
There, an employee of Standard & Poor’s was asked to rate a CDO backed by home
loans. When he tried to get information about the security from his superior, he received
an email stating that “[a]ny request for loan level tapes is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE!!!
Most investors don’t have it and can’t provide it. Nevertheless we MUST produce a
credit estimate. It is your responsibility to provide those credit estimate [sic] and your
responsibility to devise some method for doing so.” Sanati, supra note 150. At the
Congressional hearing, CRA profits were also highlighted. Representative Henry
Waxman declared that “total revenues for the three firms doubled from $3 billion in
2002 to over $6 billion in 2007.” Waxman also said, “Moody’s had the highest profit
margin of any company in the S&P 500 for five years in a row.” Id.
155. Cyrus Sanati, California Investigates Credit Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/california-investigates-creditrating-agencies.
156. Id.
157. In 2009, the IMF concluded that a lack of regulation was principally
responsible for the crisis, particularly in regard to CRAs. What Went Wrong: The IMF
Blames Inadequate Regulation, Rather than Global Imbalances, for the Financial Crisis,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13251429.
158. At the Gates of Hell: Banks and Brokers are Having a Terrible Time. Now the
Misery is Spreading, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/1
0181281.
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V. MEASURING RISK UNDER BASEL III
Responding to the failures of the financial crisis, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) revised its capital rules in an attempt
“to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the
banking sector.”159 In September 2010, BCBS released a summary of
the reforms called Basel III.160 In short, under the reforms, most banks will
have to hold more capital than under previous Basel frameworks.161
Because the Basel III standards are not binding on member states, each
country must implement its own legislation to give them the force of law.162
As a result, the actual rules applicable to each bank will likely vary. 163
In particular, the ways that banks will assess credit risk will vary
depending upon the jurisdiction.164
Basel III is similar to Basel II, but the two schemes differ in some
important respects. 165 Although Basel III still permits reference to
CRAs, it amends the standardized approach, requiring banks to assess
exposures and determine whether the risk estimates based on CRAs are
appropriate.166 Basel III also requires that external credit ratings be
“publicly available, on a non-selective basis and free of charge.”167
A. Implementation of Basel III
1. European Union
Banking in the European Union (“EU”) involves a complex web of
domestic and international banking regulators.168 Each EU nation,

159. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, BIS, International Regulatory
Framework for Banks (Basel III), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2012).
160. See R.A., Financial Reform: Meet Basel III, ECONOMIST BLOG, (Sept. 13, 2010)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/financial_reform.
161. Id.
162. Gregory J. Lyons et al., Basel III Final Rules Issued, LEVERAGED FINANCING
2011 43, 48 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Order No. 29672, 2011).
163. See infra Part V–VI.
164. See infra Part V–VI.
165. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, BIS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, 3–5 (June 2011), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter Global Regulatory Framework];
Revised Framework, supra note 17, at 1.
166. Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 165, at 52.
167. Id. at 53.
168. Recently, the European Commission (EC) created two new regulatory bodies
to deal with the challenges presented by the interconnectedness in global banking. See
Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243,
277–81 (2010). These regulatory bodies are the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”)
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however, is ultimately responsible for adopting and enforcing its own
banking regulations.169 Consequently, “supervision remains decentralized
at the level of the Member States.”170 Therefore, like the Basel agreements
that rely on the G20 members’ domestic legislation for their force,
banking regulations passed by the European Commission (“EC”) still
require implementation by the EU’s members.171
The EU will implement the Basel III proposals through its Capital
Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”), which is planned to be in force
by January 1, 2013, and fully implemented by January 1, 2019.172 CRD
IV generally permits both reference to CRAs and the use of internal
models.173 The EC recommends that when banks make decisions about
which assets to hold, “external credit ratings may be used as one factor
among others in this process but shall not prevail. In particular, internal
methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external
ratings.” 174
In making credit assessments, the EC officially states that it prefers
internal ratings wherever possible, but that in some circumstances it may

and its parent agency, the European System of Financial Supervisors (“ESFS”). Id. at
278. The ESRB has the duty to prevent another European financial crisis, while the
ESFS must “monitor and assess threats to financial stability.” Prudential Supervision of
the EU Financial Institutions Moves to the Centre, GIBSON DUNN, June 22, 2009,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/PrudentialSupervisionofEUFinancial
Institutions.aspx. Believing national regulators to be in a better position to influence
day-to-day banking, the ESFS’s role is essentially to coordinate initiatives among
national regulators. Pan, supra note 168, at 278–79. The ESFS also includes the following
three sub-agencies: the European Banking Authority (“EBA”), European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Id. at
278.
169. Luis Garicano & Rosa M. Lastra, Towards an Architecture for Financial
Stability: Seven Principles, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 597, 603 (2010).
170. Id.
171. This is true for CRD IV and other EC directives.
172. Press Release, Europa, CRD IV Frequently Asked Questions, (July 20, 2011),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/527&
type=HTML [hereinafter Europa]. Recently, however, a delay in the EU Parliament vote
on CRD IV has pushed back the adoption and implementation dates of CRD IV. See
Helen Durand, EU Basel 3 Slip-Up Unlikely to Derail Capital-Boosting Plans, REUTERS,
Aug. 2, 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/european-banks-regulation-idINL
6E8J2C5C20120802.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Public Procurement, at 12, COM (2011) 453 final (July 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Commission Proposal].
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be preferable to rely on CRAs.175 For example, the EC warns that
“internal ratings are not a panacea” and notes that in the case of
securitization, use of CRAs may be preferable because banks lack
“reliable approaches” and have “incentives . . . to underestimate risk.”176 In
short, CRD IV attempts to improve reliability by including both methods
of measuring risk but prefers particular methods be used for specific
types of assets. Finally, the EC recommends that the European Banking
Authority (“EBA”) publish annual reports on what banks and supervisors
have done to reduce overreliance on CRAs.177
2. Germany
Historically, Germany’s central bank, the Bundesbank, regulated
Germany’s banks. 178 In 2002, the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”) assumed this role and is now its
principal bank regulator.179 In late 2006, Germany implemented Basel II
into national law by amending the German Banking Act.180 In October
2011, Germany fully implemented CRD III (passed by the EC in 2010,
enhancing Basel II).181 Germany plans to implement the Basel III rules
by the end of 2012.182 A BCBS progress report notes that Germany (and
the other European countries) will follow the EU’s July 2011 proposal
for implementation.183
3. United Kingdom
The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) conducts banking regulation
in the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Financial Services and

175. Commission Proposal, supra note 174, at 12.
176. Europa, supra note 172.
177. Commission Proposal, supra note 175, at 11.
178. Dam, supra note 53, at 587 n.22.
179. Id. at 598.
180. Basel II – The New Capital Accord, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, http://www.bundes
bank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Core_business_areas/Banking_supervision/basel
_ii.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
181. Basel III, BUNDESBANK , http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Core
_business_areas/Banking_supervision/Basel_III/basel_iii.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
182. Id.
183. Basel Comm. on Banking, BIS, Progress Report on Basel III Implementation,
at 7–8 (Oct. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs203.pdf [hereinafter Basel III
Implementation]. Despite the delay in the EU Parliament’s adoption of CRD IV,
Germany has decided to expedite the implementation of stricter capital requirements.
Stephen Brown & Mathias Sobolewski, German Cabinet Pushes Ahead with Basel III
Bank Rules, R EUTERS , Aug. 22, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/22/ukgermany-banks-basel-idUKBRE87L08O20120822.
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Markets Act of 2000.184 However, the FSA and the Bank of England,
the UK’s central bank, are currently in the process of drastically revising
the banking supervisory framework by disbanding the FSA and creating
new regulatory agencies.185
The UK has fully implemented Basel II through the Prudential
Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms
Instrument (“BIPRU”)186 rules implementing the CRD.187 The BIPRU
rules became effective January 1, 2007.188 Banks in the UK may choose
the standardized approach or one of the two IRB approaches.189 Under
the standardized approach, banks may only refer to authorized CRAs.190
In the UK, the only authorized CRAs are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
Fitch, and DBRS.191 Banks that prefer to use the IRB approaches must
apply for approval by the FSA.192 The UK, however, neither requires nor
prohibits a bank from using the advanced IRB approach.193

184. News Release–Prudential Regulation Authority: The Future Approach to Banking
Supervision, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2011/
048.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
185. Id. One new agency, the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”), will be
responsible for supervising “both insurance companies and deposit-taking institutions.”
Id. The PRA will supervise both UK-incorporated banks and foreign branches of banks
doing business in the UK. Id. In addition to the PRA, there will also be a new
independent Financial Policy Committee (“FPC”) in the Bank of England and an
“independent conduct of business regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’).”
Id. The FPC and PRA will operate as subsidiaries of the Bank of England, effectively
replacing the FSA’s supervisory role with the Bank of England. Garicano & Lastra,
supra note 169, at 602–03. These renovations are expected to be completed in 2012. Id.
186. Basel III Implementation, supra note 183, at 4; see Pillar 1-Standardised
Approaches, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/basel/info/
standardised/index.shtml (last visited Sep. 20, 2012), [hereinafter Pillar 1-Standardised].
187. See Pillar 1-Standardised, supra note 186.
188. See The Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment
Firms, FSA HANDBOOK, July 2012, at 2.
189. Basel 2/CRD Implementation-Practical Information for Firms, FSA, http://www.
fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/basel/info/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 20,
2012).
190. Pillar 1-Standardised, supra note 186.
191. Id.
192. Pillar 1-Applications for Advanced Approaches, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
Pages/About/What/International/basel/info/advanced/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
193. See id.
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The UK has fully implemented the Basel II enhancements (informally
“Basel 2.5”),194 which became effective on December 31, 2011.195 Like
Germany, the UK also plans to follow the July 2011 EU proposals
implementing Basel III.196
4. Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) regulates banking in
Hong Kong.197 Pursuant to the Banking Ordinance, the HKMA has the
authority to make capital adequacy rules,198 which it exercised on January
1, 2007, by implementing Basel II.199 Under these rules, the HKMA
generally follows the Basel II framework, offering the standardized
approach and the two IRB approaches.200 In addition, the HKMA offers
a fourth option called the “basic approach.”201 Developed as a response
to concerns by banks that implementing the Basel II framework would
be expensive, the basic approach is intended for use by banks with
“small, simple, and straightforward operations, and as an interim approach
for those [banks] developing IRB systems.”202 The basic approach is
“essentially a modification of the existing framework,”203 and like the
IRB approaches, it requires approval from the HKMA.204
Hong Kong has followed the EU and updated recent changes to the
Basel rules. According to the BCBS progress report, Hong Kong has
fully implemented Basel 2.5.205 The HKMA is in a more preliminary

194. See Basel Comm. on Banking, BIS, Progress Report Table on the Basel 2.5
Adoption, (Mar. 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b2_5prog_rep_table.htm [hereinafter
Basel 2.5].
195. Basel III Implementation, supra note 183, at 5-6.
196. Id. at 7-8.
197. Douglas Arner et al., Basel II and Its Impact on the Property Market in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 125 BANKING L.J. 527, 535 (2008); see also
About the HKMA, The Chief Executive’s Committee, H.K. MONETARY AUTHORITY,
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/about-the-hkma/hkma/about-hkma.shtml (last modified July
3, 2012).
198. Arner, supra note 197.
199. Id.
200. Banking Policy Dep’t, Implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong, H.K.
MONETARY AUTHORITY Q. BULL., Sept. 6, 2005, at 6, http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/
eng/publication-and-research/quarterly-bulletin/qb200509/fa1.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. When Basel II was implemented in Hong Kong, both the basic and IRB
approaches were popular. Fourteen of Hong Kong’s larger banks, “representing over
80% of the total assets of all Hong Kong incorporated [banks],” had an interest in using
the IRB approach. Id. At the same time, forty smaller banks had been approved to use
the basic approach. Id.
205. Basel 2.5, supra note 194.
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stage of implementing Basel III. Hong Kong’s Legislative Council recently
passed a bill “creating rule-making power for the implementation of
Basel III.”206 However, the Council has only just begun industry
consultation for policy proposals to be included in these rules.207 The
HKMA has stated, however, that it is planning on implementing Basel
III reforms by January 2013, and that the scheme should be fully
implemented by January 2019.208
5. United States
Due to the dual nature of a federalist system, bank regulation in the
U.S. involves multiple regulatory agencies at both the federal and state
levels.209 Although a member of the G20, the U.S. has been slow to
implement Basel II. Twenty-two of the twenty-eight members (including

206. Id.
207. See Basel III Implementation, supra note 183. “Consultation on draft text of
rules scheduled for second half of 2012.” Id.
208. The HKMA’s timeline is the same as the one suggested in Basel III.
Implementation of Basel III in Hong Kong, H.K. MONETARY AUTHORITY, http://www.hkma.
gov.hk/eng/key-functions/banking-stability/basel-3.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
209. See Duncan E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: An
Enforceable International Financial Standard?, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 281
(2005). At the federal level, there are three principal bank supervisors: the Federal
Reserve System Board of Governors (“Federal Reserve”), the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (“OCC”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). Id.
In addition to managing monetary policy, the Federal Reserve supervises state-chartered
banks that have joined the Federal Reserve System, “bank holding companies
(companies that control banks), the foreign activities of member banks, and the U.S.
activities of foreign banks.” BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 4 (9th ed. 2005). The Federal
Reserve can issue regulations, some of which apply to the entire banking industry and
others that apply only to members of the Federal Reserve (which includes national banks
who must become members). Id. The OCC’s purpose is “to charter, regulate, and supervise
all national banks and federal savings associations. About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission
/index-about.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). “[It] also supervise[s] the federal branches
and agencies of foreign banks.” Id. The OCC has the power to issue rules and regulations
and “take supervisory actions against national banks and federal thrifts that do not
comply with laws and regulations or that otherwise engage in unsound practices.” Id.
Finally, the FDIC insures deposits and supervises financial institutions for “safety and
soundness and consumer protection.” FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
State-chartered banks that have not joined the Federal Reserve System are regulated by
the FDIC. Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/
symbol/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
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the EU) have fully completed the process of implementing Basel II. 210
Although the U.S. is in the final stages of implementation, the process is
still ongoing; only Turkey, Russia, Indonesia, and China share this status.211
The delay was caused in part by small banks’ concerns that Basel II’s
complex risk measurements would be costly and burdensome to
implement.212 This resulted in proposals to make the Basel II rules
mandatory “only for the largest, most internationally active banks.”213
Somewhat paradoxically, small banks were also concerned that not requiring
them to use sophisticated risk models would be disadvantageous.214
Ultimately, regulators enacted rules that addressed both concerns.215
This entailed, however, applying Basel I to small banks and Basel II to
large banks.216
The U.S. has been similarly slow to update the Basel 2.5 changes, as
that legislation has yet to be implemented.217 Given the incomplete and
delayed application of Basel II and U.S. bank regulators’ recent statement
that they support the Basel Committee’s efforts “to strengthen the
position of large and internationally active banks,” there is reason to
believe that Basel III will not be fully implemented in the U.S.218
Even more problematic is the fact that parts of the recently passed
Dodd-Frank Act directly conflict with aspects of Basel III. 219 In
210. Basel III Implementation, supra note 183, at 5–6; Basel Comm. on Banking,
BIS, Progress Report Table on the Basel II Adoption, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b2
prog_rep_table.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
211. Id.
212. See Robert Boudreau, Basel II, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 176, 180 (2007).
213. Id.; Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Proposal on Implementation of New Basel Capital
Accord in U.S. (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS
/PRESS/BCREG/2003/20030711/default.htm.
214. Small banks argued that large banks would gain a competitive edge from using
sophisticated risk measurements because it would result in lower capital requirements.
Rebecca Christie, Rules on Bank Capital Draw Fire; FDIC Move May Delay Final
Accord Covering World Financial System, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B8.
215. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al., Banking
Agencies Announce Revised Plan for Implementation of Basel II Framework (Sept. 30,
2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20050930.
216. Id. Specifically, large, internationally active banks have to comply with the
advanced IRB approach. Yohan Gohng & David Hesford, Basel II, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 50, 52 (2006).
217. Basel 2.5, supra note 194. Currently, Basel 2.5 revisions being consolidated
with the Basel III revision and are anticipated to be issued for comment in mid-2012. Id.
218. Gregory J. Lyons, Basel III–An Initial Piece of the Global Puzzle, 30 BANKING
& FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., July 2011, at 21, 29 (emphasis added). The U.S. intends to
apply Basel III only to the twenty biggest banks. Edward F. Green & Joshua L. Boehm,
The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1083, 1110 n.144 (2012).
219. Mitchell S. Eitel, Basel Committee Issues Final Revisions to International
Regulation, in A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2011: NAVIGATING THE NEW LANDSCAPE
345, 357 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Order No. 28327) (2011).
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particular, Basel III permits banks to rely on either CRAs, internal
models, or both. 220 In contrast, Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank
Act requires that any reference to CRAs be removed from U.S. banking
regulations.221 The BCBS implementation status report noted as much,
stating, “Basel 2.5 and Basel III rulemakings in the United States must
be coordinated with applicable work on implementation of the DoddFrank regulatory reform legislation, in particular with regard to the use
of credit ratings.”222
VI. BASEL III AND CREDIT RISK: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
From the standpoint of banking stability, the question for Basel III is
whether it will improve banks’ ability to accurately measure credit risk.
Several reasons exist to doubt that Basel’s rules on credit risk assessments
will be any better under Basel III than they were under Basel II.
A. Persistently Poor Incentives
Basel III does not eliminate a bank’s incentive to attempt regulatory
arbitrage. 223 Regulatory arbitrage occurs when “firms capitalize on
loopholes in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavorable
regulation.”224 In the context of capital requirement regulations like
Basel, this usually happens when a bank tries to maximize the spread
between its actual risk and the risk implied by its regulatory position.225
Essentially, a bank wants to hold the riskiest asset it can while staying
within the lowest risk-weight category.226 As a result, the bank can hold
as little capital as possible but still earn a return from the risk in those
assets.227 Because Basel III has not changed its risk weights, the same
incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage still exist.228

220. See supra Part V.A.
221. Eitel, supra note 219; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A, 124 Stat. 1887 (2010).
222. Basel III Implementation, supra note 183, at 5–6.
223. See N.M., Basel III: Third Time’s the Charm?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13,
2010, http:// www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/basel_iii.
224. Regulatory Arbitrage Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/r/regulatory-arbitrage.asp#axzz1gzAxtmaq (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
225. Holman, supra note 70, at 725.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. N.M., supra note 223.
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Basel III attempts to offset these incentives to engage in regulatory
arbitrage by stating that “[i]n those instances where a bank determines
that the inherent risk of such an exposure, particularly if it is unrated, is
significantly higher than that implied by the risk weight to which it is
assigned, the bank should consider the higher degree of credit risk in the
evaluation of its overall capital adequacy.”229 Essentially, Basel III states
that whenever an asset’s risk is underestimated, the banks must voluntarily
opt for the riskier evaluation, potentially increasing the capital charge for
that asset, and lowering the banks’ potential returns.230 In practice, such
a requirement might be difficult to enforce because banks have a propensity
to compete with other banks to take whatever advantages might increase
their profitability.231 Banks could easily adjust their complex internal
risk models to reach a more favorable outcome.232
The incentives toward regulatory arbitrage might manifest themselves
slightly differently depending upon whether the bank employs the
standardized or IRB methods.233 Basel III still provides the standardized
approach, which permits reliance on CRAs. 234 Banks that choose the
standardized approach still need to make their own evaluation as to
whether those risk weights are appropriate.235 In a sense, Basel III converts
the standardized approach into a “modified IRB” approach because
under the standardized approach the bank must still make its own risk
judgments.236 A profit-driven and rational bank applying the standardized
approach will likely try to find some basis to conclude that the least risky
CRA evaluation is appropriate.237 The more complex the security, the
more likely it is that reasonable minds will disagree about a security’s
risk level. A bank would probably pick the analysis that best supports
its interest in holding less capital.238
A bank that chooses to employ the IRB approach will face similar
incentives to discount the risk assessment of a given asset.239 The difference
229. Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 165, at 52.
230. Id.
231. N.M., supra note 223.
232. Id.
233. See supra Part VI.A.
234. See supra Part V.A.
235. Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 165, at 52. “Banks should have
methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk involved in exposures to
individual borrowers or counterparties as well as at the portfolio level. Banks should
assess exposures, regardless of whether they are rated or unrated, and determine whether
the risk weights applied to such exposures, under the Standardised Approach, are
appropriate for their inherent risk.” Id.
236. Id. at 52–53.
237. N.M., supra note 223.
238. Id.
239. See id.
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will be that instead of deferring to a favorable rating issued by a CRA,
the bank may use its own methodology to support that conclusion.240
For CRA ratings to be valid under Basel III, the CRA must make
“credit assessment, procedures, methodologies, assumptions, and the key
elements underlining the assessments” publicly available.241 This
information must also be available on a “non-selective basis and free of
charge.”242 If the ratings are made available only to the parties in a
transaction, then they do not satisfy Basel III’s requirements.243 Despite
these stipulations, Basel III includes a footnote that permits a CRA to
charge the issuer, as long as it “provide[s] an adequate justification,
within their own publicly available Code of Conduct.”244 Basel III aims
to make CRAs more reliable by requiring that the CRAs disclose “whether
the issuer participated in the assessment process” as well as “the general
nature of [the CRA’s] compensation arrangements with assessed entities.”245
In short, banks can still rely on CRAs as long as the CRAs comply
with a handful of new requirements.246 The increased disclosure might
help create a consensus about a given security’s riskiness. At the same
time, it might simply lead to competing and widely differing theories
about a security’s risk. Additionally, Basel III does not prevent CRAs
from advising issuers on how to structure a security to receive a given
rating.247 Nor does Basel III prohibit CRAs from being paid by the same
people whose securities they will rate.248 Therefore, the same basic
framework that leads to conflicts of interest, rating shopping, and CRA
consulting is still permitted under Basel III.249 Further, the incentive that
banks have to engage in regulatory arbitrage under Basel III still allows
substantial room to massage numbers to fit the interests of the banks or

240. See supra Part III.C.2.
241. Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 165, at 53.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 53 n.46.
245. Id. Basel III also requires CRAs to fulfill six general requirements: objectivity,
independence, international access/transparency, disclosure, resources, and credibility. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra Part III.C.1.
249. See supra Part III. In the U.S., however, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that any
reference to CRAs be removed from U.S. banking regulations. See supra Part V.A.5.
The incentives for the banks to employ internal models that produce favorable and lessthan-objective credit risk assessments will still be in place. Id.
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CRAs. Because banks prefer to have less risky ratings250 and CRAs
compete for the business of the issuers,251 incentives to stretch the numbers
cuts only in one direction: towards a tendency to underestimate the risk
level.252 Basel III’s only counterbalance to this phenomenon is to ask
banks to voluntarily opt for a higher risk-weight whenever the bank
determines that Basel III’s risk-weight prescription underestimates the
asset’s risk.253
Basel III’s remedies for these systemic problems are probably not
enough. Improving the problems inherent in CRAs will likely require a
serious restructuring of how they do business. For example, instead of
having the issuer choose and pay the CRA for a rating, a government
could set up a system where CRAs are randomly assigned to issuers.
The government could pay the CRA a fixed-fee for each security it rates.
Each issuer would pay into a fund that the government would use to pay
the CRAs. To ensure quality ratings, the government could set a baseline
threshold for quality that the CRA must meet to be eligible to rate
securities. This would remove the incentive of CRAs to cater to the
needs of banks, and instead encourage them to compete on the basis of
quantity, subject to baseline quality standards. A rotating or random
matching of CRA to issuer could better prevent socially-detrimental
relationships between CRAs and issuers. Furthermore, the government
could employ CRAs to audit banks that choose to employ the IRB method.
CRAs have more expertise in risk modeling and would therefore be better
equipped to complete such an analysis. By removing the incentive for
CRAs to be biased in favor of the issuer, the government could better
ensure that a bank’s IRB models accurately reflect the risk on its books.
Such drastic restructuring of the CRA framework could also mitigate
regulatory arbitrage. Banks, however, will likely still be able to predict
with reasonable accuracy the ratings that their assets will receive and
therefore will likely still try to maximize the difference between the
predicted risk-weight they will receive and the actual risk of the asset.
The difference under this hypothetical scheme is that banks would have
much less influence in the final decision; if a CRA found the security to
be too close to the threshold, it could more easily award the higher risk
rating.

250.
251.
252.
253.
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B. Variance Among Countries
Another difficulty with Basel III is that there is no single entity that
has the power to enforce its standards uniformly across borders.254 Basel
III’s recommendations are simply guidelines; each country will still have
to adopt and implement its own rules.255
This problem exists for all G20 members, but the EU also faces an
analogous problem. Even if the EU adopts Basel III (as it plans to with
the CRD IV),256 member states of the EU will still be individually
responsible for implementing their own legislation. 257 The EU has
anticipated this problem and created the “single rule book” approach,
which attempts to harmonize Basel’s implementation as much as possible
across EU member states.258 The extent to which member countries will
comply, however, remains to be seen. In January 2012, Germany and
France expressed a desire to relax Basel III’s implementation, apparently
to combat a perceived “negative effect” on growth.259 This resulted in
strong disagreements with UK regulators who were pushing for stricter
standards.260 With a debt crisis and about six years until Basel III becomes
fully implemented,261 it is not unreasonable to believe that EU member
countries will continue to disagree about how best to implement its rules.
Even if the EU implements uniform rules, global banks will still face a
variety of regulatory environments. For example, a bank that operates in
Hong Kong will have four options (standardized, basic, and two IRB
approaches),262 permitting it a wider array of choices about how to best
assess its credit risks. In contrast, if the U.S. does not repeal the DoddFrank Act but instead adopts non-conflicting provisions of Basel III, the
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.A.1.
Lyons, supra note 218, at 29.
See The Basel Accord and Capital Requirements Directive, FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/basel (last visited Sept. 20,
2012) [hereinafter Capital Requirements Directive].
259. Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, Paris and Berlin Seek to Dilute Bank Rules,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f8485a8-4500-11e1a719-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1mf9Wu3jV. However, Germany’s Finance Minister later
rejected the claim that both countries were seeking to relax the rules. France, Germany
to Implement Basel III Rules: Schaeuble, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/01/23/eurozone-schaeuble-idUSL5E8CN15X20120123.
260. Barker & Masters, supra note 259.
261. See supra Part V.A.1.
262. See supra Part V.A.4.
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same bank would essentially have two choices (foundation IRB and
advanced IRB).263 In Europe and the UK, these banks would have three
options (standardized and the two IRB approaches).264
The variance in rules among Hong Kong, the UK, the EU, and Germany
is actually relatively minor, at least as it relates to measuring credit risk.
Hong Kong’s additional basic option is not so drastically different from
the standardized or IRB approaches.265 In effect, banks in these countries
will still choose either to use CRAs or their own models, and that choice
is mostly determined by the size and resources of the bank.266
The U.S. approach, on the other hand, is much more limiting. DoddFrank’s prohibition of the use of CRAs means that smaller banks will no
longer be able to rely on CRAs to determine the risk level of their
loans.267 (Of course, the shift in policy away from the use of CRAs will
not affect banks that have already been using their own internal models,
which tend to be larger banks.268) Smaller banks will either have to develop
their own internal models or wait until the U.S. develops its own objective
criteria. Until this issue is resolved, this variance will likely create
confusion and extra expense for some banks.
Banks that choose the standardized approach might have a number of
choices of CRAs, depending upon the country. The EU and UK recognize
only four CRAs: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and DBRS.269 The
U.S. currently recognizes none. Notably, before Dodd-Frank, banks had
ten possible options.270 Hong Kong recently approved the use of two more
CRAs: Japan Credit Rating Agency and Credit Analysis and Research
Limited.271 Again, too much competition among CRAs may impair the
objectivity of the ratings.272
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra Part V.A.5.
See supra Part V.A.1–3.
See supra Part V.A.4.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.A.5.
See supra Part V.A.5.
See supra Part V.A.3; Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF),
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/risk/ecaf/html/index.en.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
270. These included: A.M. Best Company, Inc.; DBRS Ltd.; Egan-Jones Rating
Company; Fitch, Inc.; Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd; Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.;
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.; Rating and Investment Information, Inc.; Realpoint
LLC; and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Credit Rating Agencies–
NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last modified May 12, 2011).
271. Japan Credit Rating Company can be used for banks that have their headquarters in
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, or Hong Kong. Press Release, Japan Credit
Rating Agency, JCR Recognized as an Eligible ECAI by Hong Kong (Dec. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.jcr.co.jp/reportqa/pdfen/2011122210e.pdf. Banks in Hong Kong
can use Credit Analysis and Research Limited’s ratings to measure credit risk of
exposures to Indian corporations. Press Release, Capital Ratings, Analysis and Research
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Differing timelines for implementation will create another problem.
Germany, the UK, and Hong Kong have all stated that they intend to
follow the same implementation schedule as the EU,273 and although the EU
has attempted to harmonize the implementation schedule by agreement,274
countries may still disagree about when the best time to implement Basel
III will be.275
The U.S. has historically been slow to implement Basel rules.276
Despite being a vocal proponent of Basel II’s recommendations, the U.S.
did not fully implement Basel II and then only did so after significant
delay.277 Basel III’s conflicts with the Dodd-Frank Act will likely further
delay the implementation of Basel III, if it is adopted at all.278
VII. CONCLUSION
Even ignoring the lack of uniform global standards, Basel III’s rules
regarding credit risk assessment still need improvement. The standardized
approach needs to either end its reliance on CRAs or find some way to
restructure the incentives driving the CRAs’ business models.279 The
IRB approach can be appropriate and reliable as long as supervisors can
adequately understand and critically analyze the models that the banks
use.280
Moreover, temporal and geographic differences may create an uneven
regulatory environment.281 Banks looking to maximize their competitive
advantage will have reason to evaluate the relative regulatory benefits of
doing business in one country over another. Whether these differences
are extreme enough to impair Basel III’s goal of stabilizing global
banking is unclear. Much turns, however, on how accurately credit risk

Limited Recognised as an External Credit Assessment Institution for Regulatory Capital
Framework in Hong Kong (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.careratings.com/Portals/
0/CareAdmin/NewsFiles/SplAnalysis/Press%20Release%20of%20Hong%20Kong%20
Recognition.pdf.
272. See supra Part III.C.1.
273. See supra Part V.A.2–4.
274. Capital Requirements Directive, supra note 258.
275. See supra Part V.A.
276. See supra Part V.A.5.
277. Boudreau, supra note 212, at 177–79.
278. See supra Part V.A.5.
279. See supra Part VI.A.
280. See supra Part VI.A.
281. See supra Part VI.B.
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is measured.282 If the risks inherent in MBSs had been accurately assessed,
the mortgage crisis in the U.S. may have been less severe.283
In general, however, Basel III’s rules on measuring credit risk are
similar to those in Basel II.284 Unless financial instruments become less
complex in the future, regulators need to find a way to ensure that banks
hold an appropriate level of reserve capital. 285 Because financial
instruments will likely remain intricate, banks will still have an incentive
to game their capital requirement levels, often with the assistance of
CRAs.286

282.
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284.
285.
286.
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